Sunday, August 26, 2007
PI, Topic - 3 Funny moments
What was the funniest thing that happened to you while you were at Torrington?
Sunday, August 19, 2007
PI, Topic - 2 Best thing working for Torrington
What was the best thing about working for Torrington?
Sunday, August 12, 2007
DISCUSSION TOPIC(DC Topic) - 7. Year end stock values
. …………..…….IR…….Timken
As of
12/31/1998.…..$46.51.…$17.97
12/31/1999.……54.83.….20.19
12/29/2000.…..41.88.….15.12
12/31/2001.……41.81.….16.18
12/31/2002.……43.06.….19.10
Sell off Torrington to Timken
12/31/3003.……67.88.….20.06
12/31/2004.……80.30.….26.02
12/30/2005.……80.74.….32.02 IR stock split 2:1 9/2/05
12/29/2006.……78.26.….29.18
Avg. of 1st 7 end of the month values
...in 2007..……….94.48.….32.16
IR stock is up 119% after shedding Torrington whereas Timken stock is up just over 68% since then, 12/31/2002. IR stock value keeps rising.
I would like to be able to say the swing in stock prices was the effect of the Torrington transaction but of course I can’t. There are too many other factors that have come into play in these two organizations to draw such a conclusion.
But, can we conclude with a little more veracity that the acquisition of Torrington was beneficial to Timken and the price of its stock? Has anyone made a more in depth analysis of the financials over the years. Do you have any comments? Yes it seems to have been a benefit to Timken as well as a benefit to IR where the expectation for performance appears to be greater than at Timken.
Below is a summary of Sales and Operating Income for Timken which are made to include Torrington in the years prior to 2003.
- The Timken Company……………Including Torrington
………………………………........................pre 2003.......
.................Net Sales.......Oper. Inc…Net Sales.....Oper. Inc
…...1999.....$2,495.0.......$132.8..….$3,734.500...$278,500
..... 2000.....$2,643.0.......$105.6.....$3,804.000...$278,200
..... 2001.....$2,447.2........($17.7)..…$3,525.000..…$84.400
..... 2002.....$2,384,077....$85,657...$3,587.527...$170,807
..... 2003....$3,626,490...$101,875...$3,626,490...$101,875
..... 2004.....$4,287,197...$234,928....$4,287,197...$234,928
..... 2005.....$4,823,167...$326,960....$4,823,167...$326,960
..... 2006.....$4,973,365...$219,350....$4,973,365...$219,350
Torrington seems to be a plus for Timken. It seems to be a question of expectation where it would be more for IR than Timken,
As of
12/31/1998.…..$46.51.…$17.97
12/31/1999.……54.83.….20.19
12/29/2000.…..41.88.….15.12
12/31/2001.……41.81.….16.18
12/31/2002.……43.06.….19.10
Sell off Torrington to Timken
12/31/3003.……67.88.….20.06
12/31/2004.……80.30.….26.02
12/30/2005.……80.74.….32.02 IR stock split 2:1 9/2/05
12/29/2006.……78.26.….29.18
Avg. of 1st 7 end of the month values
...in 2007..……….94.48.….32.16
IR stock is up 119% after shedding Torrington whereas Timken stock is up just over 68% since then, 12/31/2002. IR stock value keeps rising.
I would like to be able to say the swing in stock prices was the effect of the Torrington transaction but of course I can’t. There are too many other factors that have come into play in these two organizations to draw such a conclusion.
But, can we conclude with a little more veracity that the acquisition of Torrington was beneficial to Timken and the price of its stock? Has anyone made a more in depth analysis of the financials over the years. Do you have any comments? Yes it seems to have been a benefit to Timken as well as a benefit to IR where the expectation for performance appears to be greater than at Timken.
Below is a summary of Sales and Operating Income for Timken which are made to include Torrington in the years prior to 2003.
- The Timken Company……………Including Torrington
………………………………........................pre 2003.......
.................Net Sales.......Oper. Inc…Net Sales.....Oper. Inc
…...1999.....$2,495.0.......$132.8..….$3,734.500...$278,500
..... 2000.....$2,643.0.......$105.6.....$3,804.000...$278,200
..... 2001.....$2,447.2........($17.7)..…$3,525.000..…$84.400
..... 2002.....$2,384,077....$85,657...$3,587.527...$170,807
..... 2003....$3,626,490...$101,875...$3,626,490...$101,875
..... 2004.....$4,287,197...$234,928....$4,287,197...$234,928
..... 2005.....$4,823,167...$326,960....$4,823,167...$326,960
..... 2006.....$4,973,365...$219,350....$4,973,365...$219,350
Torrington seems to be a plus for Timken. It seems to be a question of expectation where it would be more for IR than Timken,
Sunday, August 5, 2007
DISCUSSION TOPIC - 6.FAFNIR, a benefit or a noose
In the early sixties, Torrington considered an acquisition of Fafnir. It fell apart because there was no benefit to Torrington. Bennett came along in 1985 and thought differently. Was it megalomania? It is hard to conceive how given a few more years after initial inquiry, the Fafnir operation would suddenly become attractive.
The question for those who have dealt with Fafnir is “Was there a benefit to Torrington of acquiring Fafnir?” We know their plant in Arkadelphia, Arkansas was subsequently shut down. There were labor problems at the HQ plant in New Britain, Connecticut, more at the Newington plant. These also were shut down. The plant in Wolverhampton, England was sold off to Timken. What did Fafnir bring to Torrington other than a noose?
It is hard to rationalize the Fafnir acquisition as a strategically sound move. If it was such a good acquisition why were its production assets soon decimated? Did we think we could resolve a labor union dominated company?
Going back again to Lieberthal, “ Progress Through Precision…” p. 140 “No single event would have greater impact on the changing complexion of The Torrington Company than the merger with the Fafnir Bearings Division of Textron in the fall of 1985.” Ask yourself, why would Textron want to sell? Does one sell off a good thing?
For that matter, in 1987, Torrington additionally acquired the commercial bearing assets of New Departure Hyatt, which was a division of General Motors. Again, would GM sell a good and profitable operation? Were we buying sick businesses with blinders so that given the exposure, in time, Torrington itself would acquire the malady?
Another question, was this the beginning of Torrington’s downfall? Tom Bennett felt the “sales and market position of Fafnir were 100% complementary with those of Torrington” and yet the resolution to move forward was to close down its manufacturing facilities.
The Fafnir brand was made to replace “Heavy” or “Bantam Bearings” and a new outside VP, Steve Martin, was put in charge. Was this an improvement over the Torrington people who had brought us thus far or, were we digging ourselves a grave full of heavy bearings that Timken would ultimately covet ?
In 2003, Timken initially approached IR with an interest solely in the Fafnir Division (previously known as “Heavy Bearings“) but then got interested in Needle Bearings. Must be Needle Bearings were a juicier plum.
It appears Timken now expects to run Needle Bearings the way they run Heavy Bearings, without the Engineering lab support so vital to automotive and multi application uses. Good luck, Timken.
Our perspective is retrospective, with one proviso, The Torrington Company no longer exists.
Now, that’s a mouthful. Fafnir, benefit or noose.
Norm M.
The question for those who have dealt with Fafnir is “Was there a benefit to Torrington of acquiring Fafnir?” We know their plant in Arkadelphia, Arkansas was subsequently shut down. There were labor problems at the HQ plant in New Britain, Connecticut, more at the Newington plant. These also were shut down. The plant in Wolverhampton, England was sold off to Timken. What did Fafnir bring to Torrington other than a noose?
It is hard to rationalize the Fafnir acquisition as a strategically sound move. If it was such a good acquisition why were its production assets soon decimated? Did we think we could resolve a labor union dominated company?
Going back again to Lieberthal, “ Progress Through Precision…” p. 140 “No single event would have greater impact on the changing complexion of The Torrington Company than the merger with the Fafnir Bearings Division of Textron in the fall of 1985.” Ask yourself, why would Textron want to sell? Does one sell off a good thing?
For that matter, in 1987, Torrington additionally acquired the commercial bearing assets of New Departure Hyatt, which was a division of General Motors. Again, would GM sell a good and profitable operation? Were we buying sick businesses with blinders so that given the exposure, in time, Torrington itself would acquire the malady?
Another question, was this the beginning of Torrington’s downfall? Tom Bennett felt the “sales and market position of Fafnir were 100% complementary with those of Torrington” and yet the resolution to move forward was to close down its manufacturing facilities.
The Fafnir brand was made to replace “Heavy” or “Bantam Bearings” and a new outside VP, Steve Martin, was put in charge. Was this an improvement over the Torrington people who had brought us thus far or, were we digging ourselves a grave full of heavy bearings that Timken would ultimately covet ?
In 2003, Timken initially approached IR with an interest solely in the Fafnir Division (previously known as “Heavy Bearings“) but then got interested in Needle Bearings. Must be Needle Bearings were a juicier plum.
It appears Timken now expects to run Needle Bearings the way they run Heavy Bearings, without the Engineering lab support so vital to automotive and multi application uses. Good luck, Timken.
Our perspective is retrospective, with one proviso, The Torrington Company no longer exists.
Now, that’s a mouthful. Fafnir, benefit or noose.
Norm M.
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